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On ALAn GOLdmAn’s PhilosoPhy and the novel
by Richard Eldridge
It is worth at least a moment to note and praise Alan Goldman’s methodological stance in Philosophy and the novel.1 Goldman reflects 
appreciatively on the achievements of specific novels in order to arrive 
at philosophically interesting results about interpretation and moral 
understanding. In his appreciative reflections, Goldman is aware of, 
but by no means bound by, recent work in experimental moral psychol-
ogy (for example, arguments against the existence of character) and 
metaethics (for example, standard realism/antirealism debates). The 
result is a powerful demonstration not only of the human, cognitive, 
and ethical interest of the novel but also of the ability of the novel to 
inform and transform our thinking about psychology and ethics.
Part 1, titled “Philosophy of novels,” argues for claims about inter-
pretation. Two main theses are prominent: 
1) “Interpreting novels aims at appreciating their value” (p. 21).
2)  A work distinctively possesses aesthetic value when, and only when, it 
invites and sustains “the full and interactive exercise of our . . . per-
ceptual, imaginative, emotional, and cognitive . . . capacities” (p. 3). 
In developing this second thesis, Goldman draws on his earlier account 
of aesthetic value in his 1995 book, aesthetic value. Goldman’s general 
view about value is broadly Aristotelian: distinctive values attach to dis-
tinctive kinds of activity that we enjoy. In reading novels in particular, or 
at least clearly successful ones, we engage with and enjoy their “perfect 
union[s] of form and content, grasped through imagination, feeling, 
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and thought operating together” (p. 6). As these mentions of form, 
content, imagination, feeling, and thought indicate, Kant, dewey, and 
Beardsley are also among this book’s pantheon of heroes in consider-
ing literary art.
Interpreting novels, then, is not simply a matter of semantic decod-
ing. nor is interpretation directed exclusively or primarily either to 
authorial intention “behind” the work or to formal properties detached 
from expressive or semantic significance. Any “thematic theses” must, 
if a work is “to be of literary value, . . . be embodied or woven into [its] 
narrative, characterization, and even setting, formal structure, and prose 
style” (p. 7). Both authors and readers know this, and their manners of 
production and reception are attuned to this requirement, at least in 
cases of successful writing and reading.
The interpretation of novels as works of literary art functions, then, 
as a kind of reverse engineering of what has been successfully achieved 
within the work, in analytically distinguishing the elements through 
which the job of embodying literary value has been done. Interpretation 
selects properties and guides attention to the appreciation of value (p. 
23). It “aims at understanding and appreciation” (p. 24). As a kind of 
“inference to the best explanation” of how the task of producing a valu-
able, appreciatable literary object has been carried out, interpretation 
stands between description—e.g., paraphrase of individual sentences, 
where meanings are readily enough agreed upon—and appreciation or 
felt engagement with values (p. 29). For example, in interpreting, “we 
must judge whether the characters in the sun also Rises morally develop 
by explaining for maximal appreciation the descriptions of their actions 
and thoughts in the text, whatever interpretation of their descriptions 
along these lines (if any) was intended by Hemingway” (p. 33). 
Given the further assumptions that “artworks can be appreciated in 
different ways” and may “have potential values that cannot be realized 
simultaneously” (p. 38), then a third thesis immediately follows from 
this picture of interpretation:
3)  “There will be incompatible interpretations or explanations [of the 
achievement of literary aesthetic value in a work] that appeal to dif-
ferent tastes or preferences for different aesthetic values” (p. 38).
notably, Goldman treats aesthetic value not as a function of any more 
or less immediately discernible single property but rather as a complex 
configurational feature of works. A novel possesses aesthetic value and 
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displays that value to readers when and only when readers are absorbed 
in their attentions to a considerable range of complex interrelated 
semantic, formal, thematic, historical, and intertextual features, among 
others, in following what is going on.
This general picture of appreciation and interpretation that is 
developed in part 1 of Philosophy and the novel strikes me as quite right-
minded; in particular it strikes me as apt and useful in casting light on 
the importance of close reading that is fully attentive to the complexities 
of novels in order to engage with their value. I do, however, want to 
raise two questions about this picture—one about intention, and one 
about the object of appreciation—that might complicate it somewhat 
by pointing to how authors and readers alike do their work in writing 
and reading as agents within a complex historico-semantic field.
In general, it is well to remember both that actions are typically 
overdetermined by multiple intentions and that an intention is best 
regarded as a plan in execution, quite frequently one that is attributed 
retrospectively in cases in which an action has failed to come off well. 
To illustrate each of these points: What are my intentions in producing 
and presenting this set of comments? There are many: to do justice 
to a significant book, to advance my own thinking about the issues it 
considers, to forward my own reputation, to convey enough material of 
interest so that some will want to have a beer after the session to talk 
about it further, and so on. 
some of these intentions may be explicitly formulated in my con-
sciousness; some may not be. most are such that I would be able to 
acknowledge them if they were formulated and put to me, but not neces-
sarily all are. I might be so vain about my modesty that I am unable to 
recognize my own vanity in speaking. second, we are particularly likely 
to make claims about what was intended in cases in which something 
has gone wrong. For example: “Eldridge completely misunderstood the 
book, but he was intending to get it right.”
Both these points—the overdetermination of action by intention and 
the frequent role of intention formulations in retrospective explanations 
of misfire—suggest that having and acting on intentions in general is 
not simply a matter of having some single and simple plan formulated 
in mind either prior to or after action. Goldman is right to criticize 
forms of intentionalism about interpretation such as that of E. d. Hirsch, 
for whom the meaning of a literary work pretty much is the sum of a 
number of explicitly formulated writer intentions that determine each 
of its sentences one by one, with the meaning of the work then being 
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nothing more than their concatenation. But it also seems to me right 
to say that the novel is itself a quite complexly intended object; when 
we are interpreting it we are redescribing it as the result of a complex 
plan that it both makes sense to attribute to the author and that is 
worked out in detail in the work. so there is a sense in which whenever 
we are interpreting a work we are attending to its author’s embodied 
intentions, though we are of course not at all obliged to take authors’ 
prior or subsequent obiter dicta about what they were doing in their 
works as dispositive. 
I note that Garry Hagberg made this point elegantly in his insightful 
review of Philosophy and the novel in citing Ornette Coleman to the effect 
that no matter what anyone was or was not consciously verbalizing in 
improvising in a jazz performance, what comes out pretty clearly falls 
“within the range of the idea.” I am not sure that Goldman disagrees 
with any of this in criticizing the Hirschean form of intentionalism that 
he rightly rejects, but it seems worthwhile to note that, given the nature 
of intention, there is a reasonable picture of what we do in interpreting 
that might be called plausible reconstructionism about not necessarily 
explicit or acknowledged actualized intentionalism.
In a way, the question I want to raise about appreciation is similar. 
Goldman observes that “the fundamental purpose of interpretation itself 
[is] to guide perception toward maximal appreciation and therefore 
fair evaluation of a work” (p. 41). In one sense this is surely right: close 
reading that endeavors to track what is accomplished (or bungled) in 
the detailed construction of the work is a central moment of critical 
understanding. But there is, I think, an issue about what is inside the 
work and what is outside it. That is, the boundaries are not always so clear. 
Consider Wordsworth’s attitude toward his sister dorothy at the end 
of “Tintern Abbey.” He treats her there as frozen, as it were, in nature 
and immaturity, and as thereby able to confirm for him, in her enthu-
siasm for his work, his own sanity and continuing connection to nature, 
despite the potentially apocalyptic and world-denying power of his poetic 
imagination. His attitude toward dorothy is there in the poem. It is an 
aspect of Wordsworth’s actualized range of complex intentions. But is 
it only in Wordsworth? Or is it also one version of an attitude toward 
women and their proper role in life that was in general circulation in 
English culture around 1800? I think the answer has to be that it is in 
both Wordsworth and the general culture. so when we read Wordsworth, 
we are also frequently reading the preoccupations of the culture as 
filtered through his complex agency. 
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Likewise, of course, for novels. Consider Hemingway’s attitudes toward 
masculinity. In fact, nowadays, for a variety of reasons having to do 
with suspicion of the very ideas of aesthetic value and literary achieve-
ment, working literary scholars are on the whole more likely to dwell 
on expressed cultural attitudes than on configurations that support 
absorbed, enchanted reading. I think it is arguable that contemporary 
literary scholarship goes too far in this and that it scants too much 
the imagination and creative power of the author to see and render 
things anew. But Goldman’s talk of appreciation sometimes seems to 
me to go too far the other way, in relying on a conception of aesthetic 
value as determined by complex configurations that invite and sustain 
the full involvement of individual readers, without noting sufficiently 
that both readers and writers are also occupying stances—sometimes 
complacently, sometimes critically—within wider fields of attitudes in 
circulation in a culture. 
As with the first point, I am also not sure quite how much we disagree 
about this. I, too, think that complex configurations that invite and sus-
tain absorbed engagement are central to literary art and that we need 
to distinguish between configurations that heighten our attentions to a 
work’s subject matters and those that are, on the other hand, clichéd or 
merely typical within a culture. But it seems to me that the configura-
tions that we can and should in some sense appreciate are wider and 
more complex than involving elements simply inside the work, and that 
our stance in alert interpretation may often rightly mix appreciation 
and suspicion. To join this to my first question: perhaps the real focus 
of our interest in interpreting is not the work and its configurations 
alone, but the work’s configurations as embodiments of the author’s 
complex working through of frequently shared ambivalences in attitude, 
understanding, and feeling in relation to the subject matter of the work.
Part 2 of the book, titled “Philosophy in novels,” focuses on various 
phenomena of moral development as these phenomena are presented 
in novels. The central cases are Pride and Prejudice, huckleberry Finn, 
the Cider house Rules, and nostromo. Perhaps the most important idea 
is that mature moral judgment and action require all of reason-guided 
perception, volitional commitment, and emotional involvement (p. 
112). Hence, reading a person or a situation is like reading a novel in 
inviting and requiring complex engagement that is all at once cognitive, 
perceptual, imaginative, and emotional.
Jane Austen understood all that, and she presents darcy and 
Elizabeth as arriving at moral maturity through complex mechanisms 
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of development that involve each dimension of engagement (p. 133). 
Having myself written on moral development in Pride and Prejudice at 
length—work that Goldman generously footnotes—and in particular 
focusing on the parallel between apt reading of novels and apt reading 
of character that is developed within the novel, I find nothing at all to 
disagree with in this line of thought. We should reject a priorism in 
moral theory, and we should take seriously the picture of development 
in moral understanding from initial immaturity, egoism, and errancy to 
moral maturity, as Jane Austen presents it in all its dimensions. 
huckleberry Finn presents a trickier case. Here Goldman’s main point 
with respect to standard moral theory is that moral motivation is not a 
requirement of rationality (p. 138). This has, and I think it is intended 
by Goldman to have, an anti-Kantian ring. The argument for this 
claim is that Huck is rational (he thinks clearly and argues things out, 
understands situations, and so forth) but is not motivated by the moral 
requirement to turn Jim in to the authorities. so rationality without 
moral motivation is possible. Here I found myself objecting that turn-
ing in Jim is not a genuine moral requirement, but rather a corrupt 
and bogus requirement that was generally (but not universally) held 
within a slave-holding society. Goldman considers this objection, and 
he replies to it by claiming that Huck fully accepts this corrupt social 
morality but is rational, so we have, again, a case of rationality without 
moral motivation. 
But this reply misses, I think, the force of the objection. Those who 
do hold that moral motivation is a requirement of rationality—most 
prominently, many Kantians—hold that the requirement is a normative 
one, not a matter of factual necessity. That is, one is, according to Kant, 
rationally required in virtue of a command of pure practical reason to 
have certain normative commitments and motivations, no matter what 
the corrupt ways of the world may be. In fact, as Goldman also sees, 
Huck’s various emotions about Jim and the authorities evince a less-than-
wholehearted acceptance of that corrupt social morality, so that Huck 
is in part responding via his emotional life to a genuine, noncorrupt, 
moral requirement of respect for the humanity of another. Therefore 
the novel contains at least a thread of the idea of a general normative 
requirement of respect for persons along Kantian lines.
Against this thought, Goldman argues, further, that Huck is not 
practically irrational, where practical irrationality is understood as 
requiring self-defeat or a breakdown of any sustainable sense of what 
one is doing and ought to do (p. 152). Huck, while incoherent in 
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professing support for the official corrupt morality and yet feeling as 
he does, does not suffer from self-defeat or a complete breakdown. so 
he is, again, practically rational enough, but not consistently morally 
motivated either way. Here I think it would be better to say that Huck 
is not fully practically rational, in particular that he is not consistently 
practically rational in all his thoughts and pronouncements according 
to the normative standard of full practical rationality that is set by the 
categorical imperative. so Goldman’s argument fails, I think, to touch 
the sense in which Kantians hold that moral motivation is a normative 
requirement of consistent practical rationality.
Both the chapter on the Cider house Rules and the chapter on nostromo 
focus on the topic of “what is generally necessary for sustaining a strong 
moral identity [and moral] motivation” (p. 158). The core thought is that 
“the health and very survival of the self [are] subject to factors beyond 
one’s control” (p. 182). This is because “an integrated self is necessary 
for a sense of meaning in life, meaning deriving from the coherence 
over time of events under one’s control” (p. 185). One possesses such 
an integrated self when and only when “action seems self-directed, 
expressive of one’s character, and under one’s control, achieving the 
values pursued, and leading to fresh intentions and plans” (p. 158).
But whether all that is the case depends on what others do and find 
intelligible or unintelligible within one’s shared social space. If things 
are as they are in nostromo in particular, where “all [are] victims of cir-
cumstantial moral luck, [where] they betray society as society betrays 
them]” (p. 197), and where “all personal relations among these char-
acters fail: none is open, intimate, and successful [and] none has his 
identity confirmed in another” (p. 198), then the very possibilities of 
moral identity and integrated selfhood are corrupted and no longer 
accessible.
There can be little doubt, I think, that Conrad’s depiction of a social 
world in south America under the thumb of imperialism is unremit-
tingly bleak and that the consequences of this bleakness are exactly 
what Goldman says they are. To return, however, to a thought about the 
author, I nonetheless wonder whether nostromo is best read in its social 
realism as entirely a counsel of despair. In particular, are we not also 
aware of Conrad’s own fullness of attention to the social phenomena 
he describes, and do we not ourselves identify with that heightened 
authorial attentiveness? Conrad’s formal and thematic achievement 
function, I suggest, despite the bleakness of its subject matter and plot, 
as themselves a kind of symbol of and placeholder for life otherwise. 
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In turn this suggests—as, among others, Joshua Landy has recently 
argued (in how to do things with Fictions, 2012)—a role in the forma-
tion of character for the reading experience itself. no doubt its role 
is not so great as to overcome on its own the forces of corrupt social 
circumstances of reading, let alone of forces due to the presence in 
one’s life of actual others, especially parents and friends. But then it is 
not nothing, either. 
To pull my three critical thoughts together, perhaps there is yet more 
to be said in favor of the importance of authorial stances, involving 
mixtures of heightened attentiveness and horror, achieved through and 
embodied in densely textured webs of words, as themselves objects of 
readerly engagement, and for mixtures of appreciation and suspicion 
within interpretation, than is quite said in this eminently humane, right-
minded, careful, and imaginative book.
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1. Alan H. Goldman, Philosophy and the novel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); 
hereafter cited by page numbers.
